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FEDERALISM AND KELO: A QUESTION FOR
RICHARD EPSTEIN
Robert C. Ellickson*
Richard Epstein started his distinguished law-teaching career at the USC Law
School. The year was 1968. He was 25. In that era, USC law faculty followed a
strategy that has since come to be known as "moneyball"-the hiring of candidates
undervalued by faculties of less adventurous law schools. 1 Two years later, when I had
the good fortune to be hired by USC, the median age of its law faculty was 33. In this
hothouse of innovation, Richard was universally regarded as the most valuable player.
This designation was literally true on the basketball court, where no other faculty
member could jump high enough to touch the rim but Richard could touch it with the
bottom of his palm. Richard visited at Chicago during 1972-73. Recognizing that he
had found his natural home, he accepted Chicago's offer of a permanent position. When
Dean Dorothy Nelson reported this outcome at a USC faculty meeting, there were gasps
of dismay. We all knew that we had lost one of a kind.
Because future historians will know the young Richard mainly from his writings,
this is a fitting occasion to describe him more fully. For starters, it is notable that
Richard's social practice has been unusually communal. He has been an intensely loyal
and dedicated member of the faculties to which he has belonged. This is not at all
inconsistent with his libertarian streak, which permits an individual to voluntarily opt for
social solidarity.
Richard possesses truly exceptional energy. On this dimension, he is situated
perhaps four standard deviations above the median, shoulder to shoulder with his
longtime colleagues Richard Posner and Cass Sunstein (two of the very few legal
scholars whose work has drawn even more citations than Richard's).
2
In this age of increasing specialization, Richard Epstein also is one of the few law
professors-again Richard Posner is another who comes to mind-to aspire to have a
command of all fields of law. Epstein has taught most of the basic courses in the law
school curriculum and his scholarship reflects the startling breadth of his legal
* Walter E. Meyer Professor of Property and Urban Law, Yale Law School. With thanks to Damon
Hemmerdinger.
1. Steven Michael Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement 120-24 (Princeton U. Press 2008)
(describing the role of USC in the early development of the field of law and economics).
2. According to a Brian Leiter tally, Epstein (4), Sunstein (2), and Posner (1) were among the four legal
scholars most often cited in law journals in 2005-2008. Brian Leiter, Top Ten Law Faculties in Scholarly
Impact, 2005-2008, http://www.leiterrankings.com/faculty/2008facultyimpact.shtml (last updated Feb. 19,
2009).
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knowledge.
And Richard Epstein is a man of remarkable courage. For decades, he has
challenged conventional opinion on a host of topics, knowing that he would draw fierce
criticism from many commentators. Although most law professors nominally support
the existence of a vigorous marketplace of ideas, most feel some discomfort when they
venture a nonconformist opinion. Richard, by contrast, revels in the heat of academic
battle.
To readers and acquaintances who do not know him well, Richard sometimes may
appear to have an excessive self-confidence. This is an affect that helps him in settings
where he is outnumbered by his critics. When he is among intimates, however, one of
Richard's endearing graces is a bent for self-deprecation. At USC, he used to regale us
with tales of his comically inept attempts to serve tea to classmates at Oxford and to
teach, in his initial class as a law teacher, the fine points of future interests. Until
Richard's wife Eileen eventually attained control over his wardrobe, he would have
handily won any vote taken to identify the least stylishly dressed member of the USC
law faculty.
Now in his sixties, Richard still maintains an affectingly boyish and innocent air. I
recall participating in a panel discussion at Yale where a social scientist who had never
met him cited a recent New York Times Magazine article that had hostilely profiled
Richard. 3 The speaker stated that he hoped that all law professors were duly aware of
the menace posed by this ogre amongst us. This statement immediately brought a smile
to the face of every law professor on the panel. We all knew from our associations with
Richard that, temperamentally, he is far more the sprite than the ogre.
THE EPSTEIN STYLE: THE SCHOLAR AS LONE RANGER
From the outset of his academic career, Richard has largely presented his ideas as
if they were self-generated-sui generis, to use a phrase from a language that he loves.
A cautious scholar starts an article by describing the previous literature on the topic at
hand, and then attempts to add a modest increment to it. This is not Richard's way. He
has developed a distinctive voice by starting from basic normative principles of his own
choosing. To resolve basic issues in the law of torts, he looks to determine "who hit
whom."4 To divine "simple rules for a complex world," he has relied mostly on his own
intuitions. 5 This approach, of course, has contributed to his astonishing productivity.
Once Richard has determined his governing normative principles, he can quickly apply
them to the issues at hand.
Richard at times does cite authority, of course, to support his choices of basic
principles. Westlaw's Journals and Law Reviews (JLR) database identifies him as the
author of 221 articles, a remarkable total. 6 Table 1 reveals the number of these articles
3. Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, 154 N.Y. Times Mag. 42 (Apr. 17, 2005) (supplement of the
N.Y. Times).
4. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973).
5. Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 30-36 (Harv. U. Press 1995).
6. The search was conducted on Feb. 9, 2009. The search term used was au(richard +2 epstein), which
likely produced a number of false positives.
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that contain citations to certain authors or sources. The table confirms that Richard has a
penchant for venerable authority. Of the sources that I chose for inclusion in the tallies,
John Locke, cited in 67 of Richard's articles, is the runaway winner. Richard frequently
cites Locke to support the notion that first possession is the prime source of private
property rights, the bedrock of his system of normative entitlements. Those who know
Richard's work also will not be surprised to see that Table 1 reveals that he frequently
makes references to Roman law (a subject that he has taught on and off throughout his
career) and to Friedrich Hayek, whom he usually cites when arguing the merits of
allocating resources by means of markets as opposed to central government planning.
Number of
Author or Source Citing Articles
Some favorites
John Locke 67
"roman law" 39
Friedrich Hayek 34
William Blackstone 31
Robert Nozick 24
Adam Smith 21
Some non-favorites
Milton Friedman's
Capitalism and Freedom I
Edmund Burke 0
Table 1. The Number of Epstein's 221 Articles that Include at Least
One Citation to Selected Authors or Sources
Consistent with his inclination to go it alone, Richard tends to distance himself
from notable conservative scholars of the generation just senior to his. Milton
Friedman's famous Capitalism and Freedom, published when Richard was in college at
Columbia, presents a powerful argument in favor of limited government and strong
protection of negative liberties. 7  Although Richard himself endorses these same
substantive positions, Table 1 demonstrates that he never elevated Friedman's book into
his personal canon. Richard's writings pay somewhat more respect to Robert Nozick, a
prominent libertarian and advocate of small government. 8 In Takings, however, Richard
lumps Nozick together with John Rawls in an extended discussion of "rival theories,"
and takes pains to distinguish Nozick's approach from his own.
9
7. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (U. Chi. Press 1962).
8. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Bks. 1974). Richard has acknowledged that
Nozick "exerted much influence on my intellectual development." Richard A. Epstein, Taking Stock of
Takings, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rights J. 407,419 (2006).
9. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 334-38 (Harv. U.
Press 1985).
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LOCATING EPSTEIN WITHIN FOUR STRANDS OF CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT
Because Richard loves intellectual jousting, I devote the balance of this essay to
posing a serious question to him. In many writings, he has severely criticized the
Supreme Court's much-vilified Kelo decision, which held that the Public Use Clause of
the Fifth Amendment did not prevent the City of New London, Connecticut, from
exercising the power of eminent domain to acquire Ms. Kelo's house as part of an
economic development project.10 My question is whether his position on Kelo is
consistent with the principles one would expect to be held by a star speaker of an
organization named the Federalist Society.
Richard is popularly identified as a "conservative," an imprecise word. To set up
my discussion of the Kelo issue, I identify four political ideologies that commonly are
included under this umbrella term: libertarianism, utilitarianism, Burkeanism, and
federalism. On some issues, these creeds point in the same direction. On the Kelo issue,
I argue, they do not.
According to Richard's own account, he started his scholarly career as a natural
rights libertarian. His chief concern at the time was the protection of negative liberties,
that is, an individual's entitlements to resist unjustifiable demands or interferences from
either states or private actors. However, with the publication of Takings (his best-known
book) in 1985, Richard's thinking took a distinctly utilitarian turn. 11 There he argued
that "[a]ll government action must be justified as moving a society from the smaller to
the larger pie." 12 This move was easy for him, however, because he asserted in Takings
that "both libertarian and utilitarian justifications of individual rights ... properly
understood, tend to converge in most important cases." 13 This has remained his position.
For example, in 1998, he asserted in Principles for a Free Society that there is an "eerie
congruence between natural law and utilitarian theories on some of the key building
blocks" of legal principle. 14
Richard's claim that libertarianism and utilitarianism are largely congruent has
drawn forceful criticism. 15 For example, even if the taking of Ms. Kelo's house would
10. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
11. See e.g. Richard A. Epstein, The Uneasy Marriage of Utilitarian and Libertarian Thought, 19
Quinnipiac L. Rev. 783, 784-85 (2000) (describing his own evolution from being a devotee of abstract
libertarian principles to an analyst who focuses on the consequences of alternative legal rules). Utilitarianism
can be considered a strand of conservative thought because many committed utilitarians, such as Richard
himself, tend to be unenthusiastic about government efforts to redistribute resources from those who have more
to those who have less. See Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm on Forbidden Grounds, 31 San Diego L. Rev.
1, 3 n. 5 (1994) (asserting that he vacillates between (I) opposing all redistribution from one person to another
and (2) tolerating it when it would be implemented entirely through the use of general tax revenues).
12. Epstein, supra n. 9, at 4. In the illustration that appears on the page cited, the shift from the smaller to
the larger pie is Pareto superior because the shift increases the size of each individual's slice. Elsewhere in this
book, however, Richard states that a government regulation may be defensible in some instances as long as the
gainers gain more than the losers lose. Id. at 200-01. As he notes, this is the Kaldor-Hicks definition of
efficiency, and more in keeping with his utilitarian creed. Id.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Richard A. Epstein, Principles of a Free Society: Reconciling Individual Liberty with the Common
Good II (Basic Bks. 1998) [hereinafter Epstein, Free Society]; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian
Foundations of Natural Law, 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 713, 716 (1989).
15. See e.g. Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, The Uncertain Relationship Between
Libertarianism and Utilitarianism, 19 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 657 (2000); Eric R. Claeys, Takings: An
[Vol. 44:751
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increase the aggregate pie of New Londoners, a natural rights libertarian might
nevertheless see it as an unwarranted interference with her personal autonomy. In many
normative contexts, however, I myself find Richard's utilitarian approach highly
congenial. I agree with Richard that judges and legislators engaged in shaping small-
bore legal doctrines usually serve us best when they give primacy to efficiency
considerations, such as the reduction of transaction costs and the provision of
incentives. 16 This sort of utilitarian logic underlies, for example, the tendency of the
common law of property to confer simple in rem entitlements on single owners.
In many policy arenas, the utilitarian approach is not at war with concerns about
distributive justice. A citizen's interactions with a state play out over many years and
occur on numerous fronts. If the state were consistently to adhere to rule utilitarianism-
that is, to strive to adopt, without regard to the incidence of benefits or costs, cost-
justified rules when dealing with the many varied items on its legal agenda-in the long
run, as a probabilistic matter, the vast majority of citizens would end up net gainers. 
17
When foundational legal entitlements are at stake, however, I myself would not
necessarily make efficiency considerations paramount. 18  These basic entitlements
include self-ownership, the protection of bodily integrity, and the ground rules that
enable exchange. Virtually all of us would strongly oppose the institution of slavery on
both distributive and liberty grounds, even in a context where it could somehow be
proven that the system of slavery would benefit the non-slave population more than it
would hurt those enslaved. And Richard, who has called self-ownership a "moral
imperative," appears to agree. 19 Most legal issues that courts and legislatures confront,
however, including the issue in Kelo, are not foundational. I agree with Richard that
these other sorts of issues are appropriately analyzed by means of a largely, or even
entirely, utilitarian calculus.
In his voluminous scholarly works, Richard usually focuses primarily on the
proper configuration of substantive rights, not on the processes of legal change and the
allocation of lawmaking responsibilities among different institutions. By contrast,
Burkeanism and federalism, the final two strands of conservative thought that I identify,
give primacy to these sorts of structural questions.
The thought of Edmund Burke is back. This Irish-born statesman warned of the
dangers of overly rapid legal change-notably, in his own time, the French Revolution.
20
Appreciative Retrospective, 15 Win. & Mary Bill Rights J. 439,452-55 (2006).
16. Epstein, supra n. 5, at 30-36.
17. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Probabilistic Compensation Criteria, 86 Q.J. Econ. 407 (1972); Richard A.
Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev.
487, 491-95 (1980); but cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 60-65 (Harv. U. Press 1971) (arguing that a
person behind a veil of ignorance would reject an approach that would not serve the interests of those who are
most disadvantaged).
18. See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 174-76 (Harv. U. Press
1991); see also Robert C. Ellickson, The Household: Informal Order Around the Hearth 13-21 (Princeton U.
Press 2008). In my view, issues of distributive justice unquestionably warrant attention but usually are better
addressed by means of broad tax and welfare policies than by adjustments to small-bore legal rules. See Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? 29 J. Leg. Stud. 821 (2000).
19. Epstein, supra n. 5, at 59. He couples this moral assertion with various utilitarian arguments against
slavery. Id. at 54-59.
20. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Frank M. Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003).
2009]
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Burke also was highly skeptical of top-down social planning and instead preferred to
assign major roles to the diffuse institutions of civil society. A liberal state, by means of
its property, contract, and association law, helps enable its citizens to build these
institutions from the bottom up.
A generation ago, Alexander Bickel was one of the few law professors to find
inspiration in Burke. 2 1 During the past decade or two, however, a highly diverse group
of legal scholars, including Anthony Kronman, Thomas Merrill, Cass Sunstein, and
Ernest Young, have praised part or all of the Burkean mindset. 22  Beyond the legal
academy, commentators such as Sam Tanenhaus have pushed Burkeanism as the most
promising basis for the revival of a conservative politics. 23 Given the boom in this brand
of conservatism, it is noteworthy that not one of Richard's many articles includes a
citation to Burke.
24
The fourth strand of conservative thought, the federalist perspective, most closely
reflects my own views on structural issues. A federalist favors organizing political,
economic, and social life in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. This calls for
the decentralization of the authority to handle a task to the least centralized agency
capable of handling that task. When significant scale efficiencies would not be
sacrificed, federalists should support the decentralization of authority from a national
government to smaller governments, and, where sensible, from governments to the
institutions and customs of civil society.2 5  The principle of subsidiarity, whose
venerable roots lie in Catholic social thought, is explicitly endorsed in the treaty that
created the European Community. 26 The same principle also is implicit not only in the
U.S. Constitution, which limits the powers of the national government, but also in the
21. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 11-25 (Yale Univ. Press 1975).
22. See e.g. Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L.J. 1029 (1990); Thomas W. Merrill,
Bork v. Burke, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 509 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich. L.
Rev. 353 (2006); Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 619 (1994). For a critical overview of the Burkean revival, see Carl T. Bogus,
Rescuing Burke, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 387 (2007).
23. Sam Tanenhaus, Conservatism is Dead: An Intellectual Autopsy of the Movement, 240 The New
Republic 12 (Feb. 18, 2009):
The story of postwar American conservatism is best understood as a continual replay of a single
long-standing debate. On one side are those who have upheld the Burkean ideal of replenishing
civil society by adjusting to changing conditions. On the other are those committed to a revanchist
counterrevolution, the restoration of America's pre-welfare state ancien regime. And, time and
again, the counterrevolutionaries have won. The result is that modem American conservatism has
dedicated itself not to fortifying and replenishing civil society but rather to weakening it through a
politics of civil warfare.
Id. at 13.
24. See supra tbl. 1.
25. Accord Epstein, Free Society, supra n. 14, at 31-39 (asserting that custom commonly is a defensible
source of law).
26. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 5 (Dec. 24, 2002), 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Id. at (C 325) 42. For both an overview and defense of the principle, see e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 331
(1994).
[Vol. 44:751
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state statutory and constitutional provisions that confer home rule on some
municipalities. Federalists tend to oppose resolving the highly contested issues of the
day-such as abortion, the death penalty, euthanasia, same-sex marriage-through
federal constitutional litigation. Federal constitutional mandates centralize in two
obvious ways: they nationalize the policymaking process and also insulate it from
legislative alteration.
27
Federalism is a close cousin of Burkeanism. Adherents of both creeds tend to be
skeptical of the benefits, in many contexts, of centralized social planning. In some
instances, however, the two systems of belief are not congruent. A federalist, for
example, might favor a legal reform that would dramatically decentralize (such as the
overruling of Roe v. Wade28), whereas a Burkean might object that a legal change of that
magnitude would be too unsettling.
29
Richard of course is fully aware that some scholars, including many who cannot be
described as Burkeans or federalists, are deeply concerned about the structural
dimensions of lawmaking. At places in his voluminous writings, he has identified
himself as a "defender of federalism," primarily on the ground that the right of an
individual or firm to exit from a state tends to limit abuses by state governments. 30 In
one article he quotes this concise summary of federalism's virtues that appeared in an
opinion of Justice O'Connor:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advantages.
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.
3 1
For the reasons that Justice O'Connor expounds, Americans have benefited greatly
from the regulatory competition that federalism engenders. Those who framed the U.S.
Constitution wisely decided, for example, to leave the making of real property law,
including eminent domain law, largely in the hands of the individual states.
In his analyses of takings law, however, Richard has never given any weight to
27. During the Jim Crow era in the South, the notion of "states' rights" became a cover for the perpetuation
of legally enforced racial segregation. Thanks in considerable part to the Supreme Court's own efforts to
redress the malapportionment of state legislative bodies and dismantle barriers that had limited the participation
of black voters, federalism today is a far more viable principle than it was several generations ago. See e.g.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that malapportioned districts used to elect Alabama legislators
violated the equal protection clause).
28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a state statute that banned abortion prior to
the viability of the fetus).
29. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter make the latter argument in their joint opinion in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992). But cf. Yair Listokin,
Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 Yale L.J. 480 (2008) (asserting that Burkeans are likely to be too
timid about adopting a new policy in a context where the policy could readily be reversed).
30. Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 L. & Contemp. Probs. 147, 147-49 (1992).
31. Richard A. Epstein, The Federalism Decisions of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor: Is Half a Loaf
Enough? 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1793, 1809 (2006) (quoting the opinion of Justice O'Connor in Gregory v. Ashcrofi,
501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)). Justice O'Connor appended to her concise summary citations to two influential
sources: Michael McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1491-11
(1987) and Deborah Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3-10 (1988). Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
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issues of federalism. 32 And the word federalism does not appear in the index of any of
the books in which he sets out his most overarching views about the structure of legal
entitlements. 33 When there are specific substantive battles to be fought, he tends to push
structural questions to the side.
EPSTEIN ON KELO
Just after the Supreme Court released its Kelo decision in June 2005, Richard
published an essay in the Wall Street Journal that described the ruling as "truly horrible"
and "a new low point in the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence." 34 In subsequent
commentary he has stuck with this negative assessment.
3 5
Richard's criticisms of Kelo have been nuanced, worthy of a scholar who has spent
decades puzzling over eminent domain issues. He does not resort to knee-jerk arguments
based on asserted inherent rights of a private landowner to resist most intrusions from
would-be government takers. His arguments instead are mostly-arguably
exclusively-based on utilitarian considerations. In Takings and elsewhere, Richard has
recognized that eminent domain can be a useful tool for overcoming holdout problems
that otherwise would stymie a wealth-enhancing land assemblage.
36
Nor does he categorically oppose the use of eminent domain to help a private
business, as opposed, say, to open a new public thoroughfare. In Kelo, the New London
Development Corporation (NLDC) had previously persuaded the Pfizer Corporation to
build a major research facility on the waterfront of the Fort Trumbull area of the city.
Thereafter, the NLDC shaped the redevelopment project on the adjoining ninety acres of
land largely, although not entirely, to benefit Pfizer. 37 The NLDC's plans called for the
construction of facilities, such as a hotel and conference center, that would directly
enhance the value of Pfizer's research complex (and also, according to project advocates,
boost the city's economy and tax base). 38 For Richard, a utilitarian, any intent to benefit
Pfizer would not necessarily negate the presence of a "public use." In his Wall Street
Journal article criticizing Kelo, Richard refers to the facts of Strickley v. Highland Boy
Gold Mining Co.3 9 There Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, sustained
Utah's authorization of a mining company to use the power of eminent domain to
acquire the rights of a single neighboring owner in order to install an aerial bucket line
32. I am not the first person to make this observation. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 Yale L.J. 203, 215-17 (2004).
33. I am referring to Epstein, supra n. 5, Epstein, supra n. 9, and Epstein, Free Society, supra n. 14.
34. Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Folly, 245 Wall St. J. Al4 (June 27, 2005).
35. Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Neglect: How to Revive Constitutional Protection for Private Property
83-87 (Oxford U. Press 2008).
36. See Epstein, supra n. 9, at 161-81.
37. Jeff Benedict, Little Pink House 107-08, 115-16, 235-38 (Grand C. Publg. 2009) (reporting excerpts
from internal Pfizer documents). Justices Stevens and Kennedy, who did not have access to some of the
documents that Benedict uncovered, in their Kelo opinions stressed the trial judge's finding that the NLDC's
plans were not primarily motivated to help Pfizer or any other private party. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478, 491-92
(2005). The trial judge plausibly concluded that the NLDC's plans were less Pfizer-oriented on Parcel 4A,
where Ms. Kelo's house was situated, than on some other parcels. Kelo v. City of New London, 2002 WL
500238 at **1, 42 (Conn. Super. Mar. 13, 2002).
38. Benedict, supra n. 37, at 115.
39. 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
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for transporting ore. The Strickley result was justified, wrote Richard, to prevent the
"blockade [of a] productive venture" on behalf of an owner of "scrub lands" who was
holding out to "demand a huge chunk of the mining profits."
40
Ms. Kelo's claim, Richard asserted, was quite different from that of the condemnee
in Strickley. He offered four distinctions. First, Ms. Kelo and her fellow claimants were
not acting strategically in that they did not want to sell their homes at all. Second, New
London's plan did not appear to him to be a productive venture. The plan had yet to
attract any private investors and also was suspiciously vague. The NLDC's plan, for
example, ambiguously designated Ms. Kelo's block for "park support." Third, even if
the New London venture promised to be productive, the project seemed not to
necessitate the acquisition of the holdouts' houses. As a result, the owners could not
obtain great leverage by refusing to sell. Fourth, according to Richard, the "subjective
losses" of the New London homeowners would be "enormous" in comparison to those of
the owner of the scrublands. 4 1 (These subjective losses would not be made whole if the
homeowners were merely awarded, as just compensation, the market value of their
houses.)
Had Richard been persuaded of the efficiency of New London's plan and had he
also regarded Ms. Kelo as having the power to scotch it by holding out, it appears that he
would not have wanted the Court to interpret the Public Use Clause to protect her.
42
Thus in Takings and elsewhere he has defended the federal constitutionality of the Mill
Acts that enabled early industrialists to place dams across streams, thereby creating
millponds that flooded upstream neighbors. At least when the Mill Act in question
would require the industrialist to share some of the gains by paying extra compensation
to those who lost their lands, Richard has argued that the Public Use Clause should not
bar the taking. 43 A utilitarian he truly is.
THE FOOLISHNESS OF NEW LONDON'S FORT TRUMBULL PROJECT
I wholly endorse Richard's conclusion that the New London Development
Corporation was not justified in using eminent domain powers to take Ms. Kelo's house.
In the United States, most city multiblock urban redevelopment projects involving total
clearance, as the NLDC's project at Fort Trumbull initially did, have turned out poorly. 44
Cities typically undertake these sorts of ventures solely because a higher-level
government has offered financial support that civic leaders find irresistible. The many
failed urban renewal projects of the 1950s and 1960s, for example, arose out of large
federal grants-in-aid. Absent fiscal inducements from the State of Connecticut, New
40. Epstein, supra n. 34.
41. Writing two years later, Richard put special stress on the third and fourth of these reasons: "So the best
approach here is to accept the constitutional tradeoff that allows the taking only when the loss in subjective
value is small and the locational necessities are great." Epstein, supra n. 35, at 85.
42. Id. at 83-86; see also Epstein, Free Society, supra n. 14, at 239-46 (arguing that the use of eminent
domain powers may be justified to overcome "serious" holdout problems, and generally praising
condemnations pursuant to the Mill Acts).
43. Id. at 240-41; Epstein, supra n. 9, at 170-75.
44. See Robert C. Ellickson & Vicki L. Been, Land Use Controls: Cases and Materials 830-31, 840-42 (3d
ed., Aspen Publishers 2005) (citing sources supporting this proposition).
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London would never have embarked on a ninety-acre clearance project at Fort Trumbull.
Connecticut Governor John Rowland and his staff actually initiated the provision of this
aid, which ultimately totaled more than $70 million, to prompt the City of New London
to revivify the NLDC.
4 5
Why are municipal pork-barrel projects so commonly the outgrowth of imprudent
federal or state spending? When funding comes from above, many local taxpayers
(some of the closest monitors of city hall) turn from opposition to support. And
politicians at all levels of government tend to relish bricks-and-mortar projects. These
undertakings provide opportunities to cut ribbons and, more importantly, award valuable
contracts. Governor Rowland well understood that construction projects can prove to be
personally helpful. The contractors and other intermediaries involved in these projects
commonly reciprocate by making campaign contributions or other gifts. In 2005, the
year of the Kelo decision, Rowland was sentenced to prison for having received free
improvements to his vacation cottage (albeit not from a New London contractor).
4 6
The NLDC's plans for the Fort Trumbull project had numerous flaws. First, the
undertaking was indefensibly large. By the end of the twentieth century, Hartford, New
Haven, and other aging cities in New England rarely were designating for redevelopment
an area as large as ninety acres (10-to-12 ordinary city blocks). Second, as mentioned,
the NLDC's original plans called for total clearance of all structures in the project area.
This bulldozer style of urban renewal, which tends to rob a city of its historic heritage, is
distinctly passd.47 Third, none of the key facilities included in the plans-namely a
National Coast Guard Museum, and a hotel and conference center to complement
Pfizer's facility-inherently required a site greater than 5-to-10 acres. A patient private
land developer can assemble a site of that size without having to resort to the use of
eminent domain. Both the Disney Corporation and Harvard University, for example,
have accomplished far larger assemblages by using tactics such as secret buying
agents.4 8 Fourth, the NLDC's plan would have situated neither the museum nor the
hotel on Parcels 3 and 4A, the blocks where all the Kelo holdouts were located.4 9 None
of the NLDC's other planned uses-office structures, high-end housing, parking for Fort
Trumbull-required consolidated acreage large enough to pose risks of serious holdout
problems. Fifth, the NLDC in effect admitted that it could have designed the project
around the lands of the Kelo holdouts, who among them controlled only 2% of the total
ninety acres. For example, when pressured, the NLDC agreed not to condemn the
45. See Benedict, supran. 36, at 9-11, 17-22, 52-54, 143.
46. William Yardley & Stacey Stowe, A Contrite Rowland Gets a Year for Accepting $107,000 in Gifts,
154 N.Y. Times Al (Mar. 19, 2005).
47. See Benedict, supra n. 36, at 265-66 (recounting an expert's testimony at the Kelo trial that only one of
the hundred New England redevelopment projects in the previous ten years had called for complete clearance).
48. Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret
Purchases and Private Influence, 92 Cornell L. Rev. I, 22-24 (2006). The first phase of Harvard's planned
Allston campus encompasses some 130 acres. See Lauren Marshall, Harvard Submits Multi-Decade Master
Plan Framework for Allston, http://www.allston.harvard.edu/news/IMP%20Press%20Release%20011107.pdf
(last accessed Sept. 28, 2009).
49. Benedict, supra n. 36, at 187, 207, 243.
50. Id. at 215.
[Vol. 44:751
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 44 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol44/iss4/5
EPSTEIN, FEDERALISM, AND KELO
building of the Italian Drama Club, a politically connected organization. 5 1 And during
various negotiations, the NLDC's chosen developer, Corcoran Jennison, offered
compromises that would have preserved the holdouts' buildings on Parcel 3.52
There is a facially plausible case for a public clearance project when a city intends
to rejigger an obsolete street layout (as Los Angeles did just north of the USC campus)
or to clean up abandoned piers and warehouses at a harbor (as Charleston, South
Carolina did when it created its Waterfront Park). Because these sorts of assemblages
commonly include public lands, a private actor without eminent domain powers cannot
accomplish them in the absence of city help. The NLDC in fact did spend a portion of
the state-provided funds to upgrade the roads, sewers, and streetlights in the Fort
Trumbull project area. 53  But few of these expenditures necessitated difficult land
assemblages. The trial judge's opinion in Kelo microscopically reviewed, for example,
the NLDC's plans for improvements to the four streets surrounding Parcel 4A, Ms.
Kelo's block.54 East Street separates this block from Fort Trumbull State Park, a
middling historical and recreational attraction. The NLDC desired to take the homes on
Parcel 4A, among other reasons, to provide space for "bus pullovers" at which visitors to
the park could disembark. The trial judge concluded, however, that there was no
necessity to place these pullovers on Ms. Kelo's side of East Street rather than on the
park's side. He asked rhetorically, "[C]an the state refuse to grant an easement of a few
feet on state park land to save these homes ... T'55
The post-Kelo history of the Fort Trumbull redevelopment project casts further
doubt on its efficiency. The Supreme Court decision enabled the NLDC to complete its
acquisitions, which it promptly did. In June 2006, Ms. Kelo, for example, sold her house
to the NLDC for $442,000, retaining the right to move the structure elsewhere. 56 The
NLDC promptly demolished the holdouts' structures, but discovered that there was little
immediate market demand for the vacant site created. Corcoran Jennison, since 1999 the
NLDC's preferred developer for the most of the Fort Trumbull project, voluntarily
relinquished that role in 2008. As of mid-2009, no ground had been broken for a new
building anywhere on the ninety-acre site. 57 In late 2009, Pfizer announced that it would
discontinue all operations at its Fort Trumbull complex and seek to sell or lease the
facility. 8
A FEDERALIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE ISSUE IN KELO
Richard and I thus agree that New London's Fort Trumbull project was a classic
example of municipal abuse of the power of eminent domain. But does it necessarily
51. Id. at 65-66, 150-53, 163-64, 175-76.
52. Id. at 275, 278-79.
53. Id. at 254.
54. Kelo, 2002 WL 500238 at **77-89.
55. Id. at *87.
56. Benedict, supra n. 36, at 374.
57. Id. at 377 (assessing the state of the project as of fall 2008); Associated Press, Eminent Domain
Battleground Still Bare, New Haven Register A3 (Sept. 26, 2009).
58. Associated Press, Pfizer to Close Site, Move 1,500 Jobs, New Haven Register CI (Nov. 10, 2009).
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follow that the United States Supreme Court should be on the front lines of efforts to
curb these sorts of government excesses? 59 Richard does not hesitate to assign the Court
that role.60 I disagree. There are several other, more decentralized, institutions that are
better suited to the task. In Kelo, these other actors included, most notably, the members
of the state judiciary and the elected officials of both the State of Connecticut and the
City of New London. Although, as noted, Richard has at times extolled the benefits of
federalism, his writings on both takings and the public use issue seldom if ever broach
the issue of the division of labor between the state and federal judiciaries.
In my view, state courts, not federal courts, should be centrally responsible for
limiting eminent domain abuses by state and local agencies. In Kelo, the Supreme Court
of Connecticut failed to perform its duties. The Connecticut Superior Court judge who
had presided over the Kelo trial had held that New London was constitutionally barred,
for lack of public necessity, from condemning the lands on Ms. Kelo's block.6 1 Instead
of affirming that carefully reasoned conclusion, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
reversed it by 4-3 vote.62 The same majority also dubiously declined to interpret that the
"public use" clause of the Connecticut Constitution more strictly than the analogous
federal clause. 6 3 Finally, these four justices rejected the dissenters' plausible argument
that heightened judicial scrutiny was appropriate in an instance such as Kelo where
eminent domain powers are being exercised to promote private economic
development. 64  Although the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Kelo
ultimately was the one that became the object of public wrath, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut, in fact, was the judicial institution that fell down on the job.
Unlike Richard, I conclude, on grounds of federalism, that the Supreme Court of
the United States was wise in Kelo to refiain from imposing a restrictive set of national
rules on cities' use of the power of eminent domain. 6 5 A state's eminent domain policies
have few effects on residents of neighboring states. When states are left free to shape
their own rules of public use and public necessity, competitive federalism is at work. 66
59. In this essay, all of my arguments concerning the use of eminent domain powers are couched in
instrumental terms, just as Richard's arguments usually are. I do not directly appraise the pertinent judicial
precedents and the constitutional and statutory texts that a judge would be compelled to discuss. Those legal
authorities are assumed to be sufficiently open-textured to permit a judicial interpretation that would give
primacy to the federalist values expressed elsewhere in the federal constitution. That the Justices who heard
Kelo ended up writing four quite different opinions supports the notion that there indeed is room for varying
interpretations. See generally Kelo, 545 U.S. 469.
60. Epstein, supra n. 35, at 8 ("As a matter of first principle, I take the decidedly unpopular view that the
takings clause (and other constitutional provisions) commits this nation to a system of strong property rights
and limited government.").
61. Kelo, 2002 WL 500238 at *74 (holding that the NLDC had shown the requisite necessity for taking
land in Parcel 3, but not in Parcel 4A, where Ms. Kelo's house was situated).
62. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004).
63. Id. at 521-28.
64. Id. at 528-36, 555-56, 568-74. But ef id. at 574-602 (Zarella, J., dissenting). The dissenters were
prepared to invalidate the NLDC's takings in both Parcels 3 and 4A. They do not make clear, however,
whether they would rest this result on the state public use clause, the federal public use clause, or both. Id.
65. 1 agree with Thomas Merrill that, contrary to its critics, the U.S. Supreme Court's Kelo decision
actually raises the judicial standard of review under the federal public use clause. See Thomas W. Merrill, Six
Myths About Kelo, 20 Prob. & Prop. 19, 20-21 (Jan.-Feb. 2006).
66. The immobility of land reduces political pressures on states and cities to treat landowners fairly. When
a city has abused a landowner by inflicting either a physical or regulatory taking, the landowner can exit from
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It is notable that the Supreme Court's Kelo decision triggered a frenzy of legal activity at
the state and local levels (some of it largely symbolic). 67  For example, Rowland's
successor as the Governor of Connecticut, Jodi Rell, largely sympathized with Ms. Kelo
and the other petitioners. She called for a temporary statewide moratorium on eminent
domain actions and set aside a total of $2.6 million in extra compensation for the New
London holdouts.68 And, just a few months after Kelo, the New London City Council
turned against the leadership of the NLDC and forced the resignation of its chief
operating officer.
69
No scholar is more responsible than Richard Epstein himself for the national
revulsion at New London's treatment of Ms. Kelo. 70 As one of the star speakers of an
organization that calls itself the Federalist Society, should he not be delighted that the
post-Kelo legal debate mostly played out within the halls of state and local government?
the abusive relationship only by selling the affected land. But, if the abuse were widely known, exiting in this
fashion would not enable the landowner to avoid financial loss because most, if not all, of the cost of the abuse
would be negatively capitalized in the sale price. Richard himself has stressed this point. See Epstein, supra n.
30, at 154-57.
Nonetheless, states in fact do adopt statutory and constitutional provisions to protect the owners of
captive assets from overreaching governments. These stem partly from forces of interstate and interlocal
competition. Even a politically connected voter, who herself would have little risk of being a victim of eminent
domain abuse, has a stake in the enactment of state and local limits on land takings. When she eventually
decided to sell her land, a state's lack of takings protections would result in lower bids from buyers. In
addition, virtually all individuals and firms that own land also own other, more mobile, assets that a
government typically would not want to lose to a neighboring taxing jurisdiction. For instance, each of the
individual petitioners who lost their houses as a result of Kelo promptly moved out of the City of New London,
vowing never to return. Benedict, supra n. 36, at 376. New London, by pursuing the Fort Trumbull project,
thus removed from the city's tax base both the petitioners' human capital and also their personal property (such
as automobiles, assets on which most Connecticut localities levy property taxes).
67. Accounts of the various post-Kelo legal developments include Steven Seidenberg, Where's the
Revolution? 95 ABA J. 50, 52 (Apr. 2009), and Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political
Response to Kelo, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 2100 (2009). Somin persuasively argues that a majority of the legislative
responses have been relatively toothless. Nonetheless, even he identifies 16 states where legislative reforms
have been "effective." Id. at 2114, 2118-19 tbl. 5. Moreover, after the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo, state
courts in some of the remaining 34 states began to interpret more strictly state constitutional restrictions on
municipal use of eminent domain powers. See, e.g. City of Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1122-23,
1136-42 (Ohio 2006); Board of Co. Commrs. of Muskogee Co. v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 650-51 (Okla. 2006).
68. Benedict, supra n. 36, at 331, 357, 363.
69. Id. at 348-51.
70. James Ely concludes that Epstein has had more effect on legal culture than on judicial decisions as
such. According to Ely, Epstein has succeeded in reopening debate over the New Deal legacy, and has
mounted a strong challenge to Thomas Grey's thesis that the idea of property has "disintegrated." James W.
Ely, Impact of Richard A. Epstein, 15 Win. & Mary Bill Rights J. 421 (2006). Richard has been modest about
his own contributions: "It is presumptuous for anyone to think that one book or even one career can shift
mainstream understanding over an institution as important and complex as property rights. But, gee, is it ever
fun to try." Epstein, supra n. 8, at 420.
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